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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
CLIFFORD B. SHOWAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20688 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This in an appeal from a judgment against Clifford B. 
Showaker for one count of burglary of a business, third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended) 
and one count of arson, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-102 (Addendum A). A jury found him guilty 
following a trial on November 15, 1984, in the Third District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding. On April 12, 1985, Mr. Showaker 
was sentenced to two concurrent terms not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of September 3, 1984, the Murray City 
Fire Department responded to a call of a fire in progress at 
Diamond Industrial Fiberglass, a builder of commercial products 
and producer of various kinds of equipment, located at 156 West 
4800 South. Investigation of the building where the fire took 
place established that the building had been broken into (T. 233) 
and that the fire was the result of arson (T. 300). At trial, 
the fact that a burglary and arson had taken place at Diamond 
Industrial was conceded and the only issue was whether or 
not the Defendant, Clifford Showaker, was the person who 
committed these crimes. 
On June 28, 1984, Mr. Showaker was fired from his job 
at Diamond Industrial. Tom Dixon, a fellow worker at Diamond, 
stated that the Defendant had told him earlier that same day that 
if he were fired he would burn the place down and start the fire 
in either the superintendent's or the general manager's office 
(T. 151, 152). Mr. Dixon also stated that he did not take the 
Defendant seriously when he made this statement and that he 
thought he was joking (T. 152). Mr. Showaker returned to 
Diamond several times thereafter to pick up his check (T. 110), 
some personal items (T. 108, 136), and to speak with the owner 
concerning his dismissal (T. 56). At no time during any of these 
instances, however, did the Defendant reveal any agitation or 
hostility towards his employers (T. 56, 136). The State 
alleged Mr. Showaker's motive and therefore his guilt was 
established by the* testimony of Mr. Dixon and the determination 
that the fire originated in the superintendent's former office 
(T. 298, 299). 
Palm prints and fingerprints were found on a barrel 
outside of the burned building at Diamond Industrial. These 
prints were analyzed by Paul Jacobs, a policeman with Murray 
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The fire at Diamond had probably been burning 
for thirty to thirty-five minutes before firefighters 
arrived on the scene at approximately 11:30 p.m., according 
to the Murray City Fire Chief, Mr. Wendall Coombes (T. 229). 
This determination was based on the fact that the smoke was 
heavy and dark grey and that accelerants had been used in 
starting the fire (T. 221). No one, however, was able to 
determine how much or exactly which accelerants had been used 
(T. 300). Neither was anyone willing to estimate how much 
time was involved in setting this fire up. It was conceded, 
however, that elaborate lengths were taken in starting the 
fire (T. 314) as close to seventy feet of trailers were 
spread throughout the building (T. 202, 318), and numerous 
cans and barrels of accelerants were also spilled (T. 70, 83, 
329). The gas tanks of the two company vans had also been 
stuffed with paper and a can of accelerant had been spilled 
in one of them (T. 245). Diamond's general manager, Noel Wiss, 
and production manager, Michael Ritchie, both stated that 
none of the empty barrels found inside the building were 
normally stored there (T. 68, 119), and Mr. Wiss stated that 
it would be difficult to more the 55-gallon barrels that were 
spilled by hand (T. 99), and that it would take at least ten 
minutes to dump out the amount of accelerants spilled in the 
building (T. 88). 
Mr. Richard Barberino and his wife Sherry both verifi 
that the Defendant had arrived at their home at 6910 South 1300 
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ARGUMENT 
THE BURGLARY AND ARSON CONVICTION OF 
CLIFFORD SHOWAKER SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
MR. SHOWAKER COMMITTED THE CRIMES. 
A. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT'S 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The jury in this case found Clifford Showaker guilty 
of Third Degree Burglary and Third Degree Arson in the break-in 
and fire that took place at Diamond Industrial Fiberglass on the 
night of September 3, 1984 (T. 451). To uphold such a verdict, 
the State must prove and the jury must find that from the evidence 
presented at trial there can be no reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed these acts. The defense did not contest the 
fact at trial that a deliberate and intentional burglary and arson 
were committed (T. 43). Therefore, it is not now necessary for 
the Appellant to argue the elements of either act, to wit that 
arson involves the unlawful and intentional damaging of the property 
of another by means of fire (Utah Code Ann. §76-6-102), or that 
burglary involves the unlawful entering and remaining in a building 
with the intent to commit a felony (Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202). Rather, 
Clifford Showaker brings this appeal on the ground that the evidence 
presented by the State at trial was insufficient to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Showaker was the person who committed 
the burglary and arson at Diamond Industrial on the night of 
September 3, 1984. 
_£. 
At trial, after the State had rested its case and after closing 
arguments (T. 449-450) , the Defendant moved for dismissal based 
on a lack of sufficient evidence of identity. The trial Court 
denied these motions (T, 450), Appellant contends these denials 
were error and urges this Court to reverse his conviction because 
of insufficient evidence. 
This Court has previously held the position that the 
fact-finder's determination on allegedly insufficient evidence will 
be upheld. State v. Moon, 688 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1984), Specifically, 
this Court does not ordinarily judge the credibility of testimony or 
weigh conflicting evidence. State v. Nagan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 
1977) . However, this Court can and will intervene and subsequently 
overturn a verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence "when the 
evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict) is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, Appellant asserts that the State's evidence 
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the 
perpetrator of the crimes, namely burglary and arson. In attempting 
to prove its case, the State relied on three factors, specifically 
motive, the discovery of a palm and fingerprint that matched that 
of the Defendant, and opportunity. For the sake of clarity, each 
of these factors will be addressed and refuted separately. 
Although motive is not an element of the crime, the presence of a 
likely motive is a circumstance which the jury can consider along 
with the other circumstances in the case. State v. Young, 550 P.2d 
1, 7 (Wash. 1976). The State based its proof of Mr. Showaker's 
motive on a statement that was allegedly made by him to a fellow 
worker at Diamond Industrial on the day Appellant was dismissed 
from that company. Tom Dixon testified at trial that on June 28, 
198 4, Clifford Showaker told him that should he get fired from 
Diamond Industrial, "he would come back and burn the place down 
or he would get even with them one way or another" (T. 151). Mr. 
Dixon further testified that the Defendant indicated he would start 
the fire "in either Allen's or Noel's office" (T. 152), Allen Match 
being the superintendent of the company, and Noel Wiss, the general 
manager. Mr. Dixon also added that he did not take the Defendant 
seriously when he made this statement and thought he was joking 
(T. 152). 
Relying on this testimony by Tom Dixon, the State 
attempted to prove that the Defendant did indeed carry out his threats. 
There was no question that someone deliberately set fire to Diamond 
Industrial on the night of September 3, 1984. Further, Keith Hall, 
captain of the Murray City Fire Department, testified at trial that 
the fire originated in Allen Match's old office (T. 287, 298, 299). 
At the time of the fire, this was the foreman's office, but it was 
the same office occupied by Mr. Match when the Defendant was working 
at Diamond Industrial in June of 1984. The State also presented 
testimony from Michael Ritchie, the production manager, that on 
the day he fired the Defendant he talked to him "for about a half 
an hour or forty-five minutes" (T. 107) . Noel Wiss, the general 
manager, further testified that the Defendant returned to Diamond 
Industrial on July 2 4, 1984 to speak with Lester Match, the owner. 
As Lester Match was not there, the Defendant spoke with Mi Wiss 
about his dismissal and did "a little complaining" (T. 56). Based 
on this evidence, the State concluded at trial that Mr. Showaker 
was so upset about his dismissal from Diamond Fiberglass that he 
came back to discuss it a month later (T. 428) , and then waited 
approximately another month, presumably so that no suspicion would 
be aimed at him (T. 444) , and then set fire to Diamond Industrial, 
starting the fire in Allen Match's office and doing precisely what 
he had allegedly told Tom Dixon he would do (T. 429). 
Following this presumption, the State alleged that 
not only was Clifford Showaker a man that held a grudge and would 
resort to committing a felonious crime to vindicate that grudge, 
but that he was totally lacking in common sense as well. Only 
someone with no judgment whatsoever would, upon being dismissed, 
start a fire in a specific office at his former employee's business 
after telling a fellow worker that was precisely what he intended 
to do should he be dismissed. In refuting that such was the case, 
the Appellant would have this Court consider the following. 
Tom Dixon, Mr. Showaker's fellow employee, testified not 
only that Mr. Showaker said he would burn Diamond Industrial down 
if they fired him (T. 151), but also that Clifford Showaker appeared 
to be joking when he made this statement (T. 152). This would seem 
to indicate that the Defendant's threat was merely made in jest, 
not unlike idle threats any employee might make and, particularly 
those who are employed in work where there are high turnovers and 
dismissals are common such as they were at Diamond Industrial (T. 154). 
Michael Ritchie, the production manager, who dismissed 
Mr. Showaker, testified that he spoke with the Defendant approximately 
a half hour to forty-five minutes at the time of his dismissal (T. 107). 
At no time, however, did he indicate that the Defendant was hostile, 
belligerent, or even argumentative. Neither did he testify that 
Mr. Showaker threatened him or the company. When the Defendant 
returned to pick up his check the following day (June 29, 1984), 
Mr. Ritchie testified that he was present, but that he had no 
conversation with Mr. Showaker (T. 110). The only other time 
Mr. Ritchie saw the Defendant was when he returned two weeks 
later to pick up some personal tools (T. 108). Allen Match, 
the superintendent at Diamond, saw the Defendant on the premises 
about a week after he was fired when he came by to collect some 
money owed him by one of the employees. Mr. Match asked the 
Defendant to leave and he did so without any agitation or con-
frontation (T. 136). Irrespective of these returns to Diamond 
by the Defendant, the State placed great emphasis on the fact that 
Mr. Showaker returned to Diamond Industrial a month after he was 
fired to speak with Lester Match, claiming this was further proof 
of the Defendant's agitated state (T. 428). Nonetheless, there is 
a less sinister explanation. 
Noel Wiss, the general mangager at Diamond Industrial, 
spoke with the Defendant for fifteen or twenty minutes on July 24, 
1984, as the owner, Lester Match, with whom the Defendant wanted 
to speak with was not there. Mr. Wiss testified that the Defendant 
expressed confusion as to why he was fired and was there to do 
a little complaining (T. 56); no mention was made that Mr. Showaker 
was agitated or hostile or made any threats. Had the Defendant truly 
been upset by the fact that he was fired, he would again have been 
showing an incredible lack of judgment in returning to reveal 
this agitation only one month before Diamond was set on fire. The 
more likely explanation for the Defendant's return had nothing to 
do with the fact that he was fired, but rather a desire to determine 
why he was fired. 
In his testimony, Tom Dixon, the Defendant's fellow 
worker, stated there was talk that Mr. Showaker would be fired 
"unless a pair of shoes was brought back or something" (T. 153). 
Presuming the Defendant was innocent of this accusation, logic 
dictates that he would try to clear his name and even that he might 
return a month after his dismissal to speak with the owner of the 
company in an attempt to vindicate himself. The fact that such 
an accusation on his record could effect his future employability 
provides ample justification for an attempt to work out such a 
misunderstanding. Further, Defendant's possible prior knowledge 
that he might be fired because he had been accused of theft may 
have precipitated his statement to Tom Dixon about burning Diamond 
down, but again it is unlikely that after making such a statement, 
getting fired for suspicion of theft, and then returning a month 
later to discuss the dismissal, Mr. Showaker would then be foolish 
enough to set fire to Diamond Industrial. 
The State's motive theory based on the statement by 
the Defendant to Tom Dixon concerned itself not only with the 
fact that the Defendant threatened to burn down the company, but 
also that he intended to start the fire in Allen Match's office 
(T* 152). The fire did indeed originate in Mr. Match's former 
office (this was the foreman's office at the time of the fire) 
(T. 287, 298-299), but there was a reasonable explanation for this 
which in no way would specifically implicate Mr. Showaker. 
The building that was burned at Diamond Industrial 
was constructed of steel and concrete (T. 62). Aside from 
the flammable materials and paper trailers that were strewn 
throughout the building, the only other substance that would 
burn was the wood in the office areas (T. 242) . Furthermore, the 
file cabinet in Allen's office was made of wood whereas the one in 
Noel's office was made of steel (T. 189). Although Allen's office 
was so completely burned, it could not be determined exactly 
what was used to start the fire. A five gallon container of 
flammables was found in that room, as well as in the reception 
area and in Lester Match's office (T. 83). From this, it seems 
only reasonable that someone attempting to burn this building 
would use the offices as a starting point as they contained wood 
which would catch fire, burn and even smolder, thereby allowing 
the perpetrator to spread the flammables throughout the building, 
connect the pours with paper trailers, and then ignite the spills 
in the offices. This would allow time to insure that the fire 
would burn, while also leaving the person responsible time to get 
out of the building before all the flammables caught fire. 
With this explanation in mind, it is arguable that the 
fire originating in Allen Match's office was merely coincidental. 
Therefore, Appellant contends this evidence was insufficient to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he started the fire at 
Diamond Industrial, and he urges this Court to overturn his 
conviction 
B. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE OF A PALM-
PRINT AND FINGERPRINTS ALLEGEDLY 
BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The State based it's second argument for Mr. Showakerf s 
guilt on a palmprint and fingerprints retrieved from a barrel 
that was lying outside of the burned building at Diamond Industrial 
underneath a shed. The State contended that this evidence proved 
that the Defendant was at Diamond Industrial on the night of 
September 3, 1984 and that, therefore, the Defendant started the 
fire. Nonetheless, the following discussion will show that this 
evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Showaker committed this crime. 
Paul Jacobs, a policeman for Murray City with consid-
erable training in fingerprint analysis, took prints from a black 
barrel lying on its side at the west end of the building that 
was burned at Diamond Industrial (T. 362). Mr. Jacobs was able 
to retrieve only one other print on a barrel inside the building, 
but that print proved to be inconsistent with the Defendant's 
prints (T. 376). The prints taken off the barrel lying outside 
the building consisted of a left-hand palmprint and four left-
hand fingers (T. 365). Mr. Jacobs testified that these prints 
were found in a fine layer of dust on the upper third section of 
the barrel (T. 362) and appeared to be fresh (T. 365). 
He surmised from the position of the prints that they were impressed 
onto the barrel when the owner pushed the barrel over. 
In comparing the prints found on the barrel to those 
of the Defendant, ridge characteristics were used (T. 368) , and 
from these the analyzer was able to determine points of comparison 
(T. 369) . Mr. Jacobs has documented as many as thirty points of 
comparison in his work, and he found thirteen specific points of 
comparison between the prints from the barrel and those of the 
Defendant (T. 373) . Mr. Jacobs testified that he felt comfortable 
in drawing his conclusion that the prints of the Defendant and those 
retrieved from the barrel were one and the same, with ten to twelve 
specific points of comparison (T. 373). 
With this information, the supposition that the prints 
found on the barrel outside of the building at Diamond Industrial 
belonged to the Defendant is a strong one. However, this barrel 
was outside the building and the only other distinguishable print 
found inside the building where the arsonist started the fire did 
not belong to Mr. Showaker (T. 376) . Because the barrel was found 
outside the burned building, this evidence allows speculation about 
when the prints were impressed on the barrel. Mr. Showaker had 
not worked at Diamond Industrial for two months before the fire 
was started. However, he had been on the premises since that 
time and a strong possibility, in light of testimony to be con-
sidered below, remains that his prints could have been impressed 
on that barrel at a time other than the night the fire was started. 
Russel Tea, a delivery driver for Fasco, the company 
that delivered barrels of resin to Diamond, testified that his 
company had a revolving exchange with Diamond whereby the same 
amount of empty barrels were picked up as full barrels were 
delivered (T. 65). This was the theory, but whether or not it 
was always the practice is arguable. The barrels were impossible 
to distinguish, even though they all had the Fasco name on them 
(T. 165, 167, 168). Furthermore, the shop foreman, Mark Thatcher, 
testified that Diamond kept no inventory on a daily basis as to 
the barrels of resin used ( and that when any of the employees 
needed the resins, they would just retrieve a barrel from the shed 
where they were stored (T. 144). Therefore, employees did not have 
to sign for the barrels of resins when they used them. Mr. 
Thatcher also testified that all of the employees who worked for 
him handled these barrels at one time or another during their 
employment (T. 144). Russell Tea, the deliveryman, testified 
that on occasion employees would help him to unload the barrels 
upon delivery (T. 167). That Mr. Showaker had occasion to handle 
the barrels of resin during his eighteen months of employment 
at Diamond seems certain. 
In the State's attempt to show that the fingerprints 
on the barrel outside the building were not only those of the 
Defendant, but that they were left there on the night cf the fire, 
the testimony of the delivery driver for Fasco, Russel Tea, was 
again a focal point. Mr. Tea testified that the last delivery he 
made to Diamond before the fire was on August 29, 1984 (T. 165). 
Because of the revolving barrel exchange that the companies 
supposedly used and the fact that the Defendant had not worked 
at Diamond for two months, the State assumed this testimony 
indicated that the prints were left on the barrel the night of the 
fire. However, the inquiry did not end here and other factors 
continued to confuse the question of how and when Mr* Showaker's 
prints got on the barrel. 
Although Mr. Tea made his last delivery of barrels 
on August 29, 1984, he also testified that he was not certain if 
there were any other barrels of resin around Dicimond or not (T. 165) . 
Furthermore, Fasco also delivered and removed barrels from Star 
Fire (T. 168) , the company where Mr. Showaker Wcis working at the 
time of the fire. Diamond's shop foreman, Mark Thatcher, and the 
qeneral manager, Noel Wiss, also testified that there could be as 
many as ten barrels of resin around the area at once (T. 94, 145). 
Another consideration with regard to these barrels 
concerns the clearning process they were supposed to go through. 
James Chance, an employee of Chem-Chemical, one of the companies 
that supplied acetone to Fasco, testified that reconditioning 
of the barrels, whereby they went through an acid flush cleaning 
process, was the policy of his company (T. 183). But Mr. Chance 
had no first-hand knowledge whether this policy was always indeed 
the practice, nor whether or not the other companies supplying 
Fasco with resins adhered to this practice. This leaves open 
the possibility that prints placed on a used barrel would not 
necessarily be cleaned off when the full barrel was returned. 
In light of the foregoing, the evidence in this 
case did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the prints 
found on the overturned barrel outside the building were placed 
there on September 3, 1984, the night of the fire at Diamond 
Industrial. That a barrel with the prints of the Defendant 
might still be on the premises of Diamond two months after he 
worked there is not inconceivable. Also, that a barrel with 
the Defendant's prints might find its way back to Diamond after 
it had been refilled is a possibility. Finally, it is conceivable 
that the barrel with the Defendant's prints on it could have found 
its way to Diamond Industrial through Fasco from Star Fire, the 
company that Mr. Showaker was working for at the time of the fire 
since Fasco picked up and delivered barrels of resin to and from 
them both. 
Considering all of the foregoing evidence, a reasonable 
doubt exists as to when Mr. Showaker's prints were impressed on 
the barrel outside the burned building. Case law supports the 
fact that fingerprints at the scene of the crime do not by 
themselves establish guilt. Rather, it must also be proven that 
the impressions were made at the time the crime was committed. 
Court in State v% Bright/ 638 P.2d 330 (Haw. 1981) citing 
Jones v. State, 156 Ga. 823r 275 S.E. 2d 712 (Ct. App. 1980) 
stated that "Evidence of fingerprints or palmprints may be 
sufficient to support a criminal conviction as when the prints are 
found in the place where the crime was committed and under such 
circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the 
time of the alleged crime." (emphasis added), In People v. Ray, 
626 P.2d 167 (Colo. 1981), a burglary case from Colorado, the 
defendant's fingerprints were found on a milk chute through 
which a burglar had entered a house from which articles were stolen. 
This case differs from the one at bar in that the fingerprints here 
were the only evidence presented that linked the defendant to the 
crime. Still, the Court stated in that case, "Because the 
inside of the milk chute was readily accessible to anyone in 
the victim's backyard, the fingerprint could have been impressed 
at a time other than the time when the crime was committed." 
Id. at 171. The Colorado Court also considered the fact that the 
defendant's fingerprints were not found anywhere inside the 
victim's home in reversing the conviction. Neither, were Mr. 
Showaker's prints found anywhere in the building that was burned 
at Diamond Industrial. 
Because of all of the foregoing, the Appellant 
would urge this Court to overturn his conviction as the evidence 
presented by the State was insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the burglary and 
arson at Diamond Industrial. 
C. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
COMMIT THE CRIME WITH WHICH HE WAS 
CHARGED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
HIS GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The State's third contention was that Mr. Showaker had 
the opportunity to commit the burglary and arson at Diamond Industrial 
on the night of September 3, 1984. The State argued that because 
the Defendant had worked at Diamond for eighteen months, he was 
familiar with the premises, the substances used and where they were 
kept and the working hours of the company (T. 427) . Based on this 
and the fact that the Defendant probably passed by Diamond on the 
way home after visiting with friends on the night in question, the 
State concluded that Mr. Showaker committed the crimes in question. 
The Defendant was familiar with the layout, the substances used 
and the working hours at Diamond Industrial. Furthermore, the 
Defendant probably passed the company on the night of the fire. 
However, this evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Showaker committed the crimes at 
Diamond Industrial. 
In determining whether Mr. Showaker had the opportunity 
to commit the crimes, one must examine the complexity required 
to commit the burglary and arson. The testimony of those who 
worked at Diamond and those who investigated the fire indicated 
that the perpetrator broke into the building through a door in 
the back of the building. This was a steel door with a dead 
bolt and, although there was a door knob on the outside, the door 
locked from the inside so that it could not be entered from the 
outside (T. 61, 121). The door had been pried open, presumably 
with a lug wrench found leaning by the door. The pry marks on 
the door matched the marks found on the wrench (T. 234) . There 
was no evidence as to who pried open this door, but it is likely 
that it took some time to pry it open. 
Descriptions as to what was spilled in the burned 
building vary somewhat, but basically they are as follows. 
Approximately 200 gallons of resin were spilled and these 
came in 55-gallon drums, resulting in about four drums being 
emptied (T. 70, 117). Noel Wiss, Diamond's general manager, 
identified these as consisting of two drums of acetone (one 
spilled in the back of the building by the two company vans that 
were parked there and one in the main building) (T. 69), and 
approximately six to ten gallons of other materials (T. 70). 
Mr. Wiss also testified that everything was stored in the back 
(T. 68) and that even though one drum may have been in the 
building, it should not have been as it contained flammables 
(T. 68) . On the other hand, Michael Ritchie, the production 
manager, said there was no reason for any barrels to be in the 
building because none of the production occurred there (T. 119). 
Mr. Wiss also said it would take him "about ten minutes to 
dump out two hundred gallons of resin"(T. 88). These drums 
could be moved by hand with difficulty (T. 99). A screwdriver 
or crescent wrench would be needed to open them as they could 
not be opened by hand (T. 102) . 
Over seventy feet of paper trailers (paper towels 
used to ignite the fire) were spread throughout the inside and 
outside of the building (T. 202, 318). Three five-gallon cans 
were found. One in the owner's office, one in the reception 
area, and another in the foreman's office (T. 83, 329). These 
cans were normally kept in the shed area on shelves behind the 
building (T. 84). Paper had been stuffed into the gas tanks 
of the two company vans, and another five-gallon can had been 
emptied of contents onto the floor of one of them (T. 245). The 
area where these vans were parked was so tight that it was difficult 
to get around (T. 92). From the above, it becomes obvious that 
whoever started this fire went to great lengths. A large amount 
of time and effort was involved in prying open the steel door, 
dragging 55-gallon barrels inside the building and opening 
and spilling them, spreading material from the five-gallon 
drums throughout the offices and reception area, stuffing towels 
into the gas tanks of the vans and spilling a five-gallon can 
into one of them and finally spreading seventy feet of trailers 
throughout the building. Nonetheless, not one of the people 
who investigated this crime made an attempt to determine approx-
imately how much time would be consumed to do all this (T. 316), 
although they did concede that whoever started this fire went to 
elaborate lengths (T. 314). 
Chief Wendall Coombs, a firefighter for some twenty-three 
years, testified that he figured the fire had been burning about 
thirty to thirty-five minutes when the call came in at 11:30, so 
that the fire probably started at 11:00 p.m. (T. 229). The 
Chief also stated that because the fire was intense it had been 
burning for some time (T. 228) , and to get that much of a start, 
the fire may have been burning more than a half hour. The Chief 
based this opinion on the fact that it could not be determined 
how many accelerants were actually spilled and that the wood in 
the building could have smoldered for hours (T. 246). Keith 
Hall, the Fire Department Captain, also estimated that the fire 
had been burning thirty to thirty-five minutes before their arrival 
(T. 301), adding it may have been as much as forty minutes (T. 288, 
289). He also said it would be difficult to determine exactly 
how long the fire had been burning because he could not specify how 
much and what accelerants had been used to start the fire (T. 300). 
But, Mr. Hall did concede that these factors would be significant 
in determining how long the fire had been burning (T. 32 4). 
Kendall Baird, a firefighter with Murray City for three years, 
testified the fire had been reported to the station at 11:15 p.m. 
(T. 215). However, when and by whom the fire was reported to the 
station by and how long it took for this information to be relayed 
to the firefighters is not certain as no one testifying had any 
personal knowledge of this (T. 240). Mr. Baird also said that 
he felt the fire had been burning maybe an hour (T. 220) , but 
depending on the accelerants used, it could have been a half 
hour (T. 221). He based his theory on the extent of the fire 
and the fact that the smoke was heavy and dark grey. 
Based on this testimony, a reasonable assumption would 
be that the fire at Diamond Industrial was started anywhere from 
10:45 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. It would also be reasonable to assume 
that it may have taken the perpetrator anywhere from fifteen 
minutes to forty-five minutes to break in and set up the fire, 
thereby commencing the whole episode between 10:00 p.m. and 10:45 p.m. 
In light of this, the next question is whether or not Mr. Showaker 
could have been at Diamond Industrial between 10:00 p.m. and 10:45 p.m. 
on the night of September 3, 1984. 
At trial, Mr. Showaker presented two witnesses to 
testify as to his wherabouts on the night of the fire. These two 
were alibi witnesses. An alibi is not a separate, affirmative 
defense, but rather is a direct and complete denial that the 
defendant was where he was said to be at the time the crime was 
committed. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976); Williams 
v. State, 671 P.2d 635, 636 (Nev. 1983). 
Richard Barberino, a friend of Mr. Showaker1s, 
testified that on September 3, 1984, the Defendant came to his 
house some time in the morning to borrow some tools (T. 400) and 
then returned about 2:00 p.m. that afternoon to work on Mr. 
Barberino's lawn and yard. The Defendant stayed all after-
noon at the Barberino's home, having dinner with them at about 
9:30 p.m. (T. 401). According to Mr. Barberino, Mr. Showaker 
stayed until "somewhere around when the news was ending and 
Mash was coming on" or about 10:40 p.m. (T. 402). Mrs. Barberino 
also testified that the Defendant had arrived at her home about 
2:00 p.m. on September 3, 1984 (T. 411) and that she recalled him 
leaving when Mash was on so that it would have been after 10:30 p.m. 
(T. 412). Although the Barberinos could not specify exactly 
when Mr. Showaker had left their home, it is reasonable to assume 
it was anywhere from 10:30 p.m. to 10:40 p.m. 
Detective Raymond Levitre of the Murray City Police 
Department timed the distance between the Barberinofs home at 
6910 South 1300 West and Diamond Industrial at 156 West 4800 South, 
approximately thirty blocks, and testified that it took him 
approximately eight minutes to travel this distance at 11:00 p.m. 
(T. 348). 
In light of all of the foregoing, a reasonable doubt 
exists as to whether or not Mr. Showaker could have started the 
fire at Diamond Industrial. Taking the minimum time the fire 
might have started, 11:00 p.m., and assuming the Defendant left 
the Barberino's home at 10:30 p.m. and taking approximately 
eight minutes to drive from there to Diamond, this would have 
placed him at the company at approximately 10:40 p.m., giving 
him twenty minutes to break into the building and set the fire. 
A more probable review of the evidence would be that the fire 
started around 10:55 p.m. and that Mr. Showaker left the 
Barberino's at 10:40, arriving at Diamond at 10:50 , leaving 
five minutes in which to break in and start the fire, a complete 
impossibility. No matter which of these time sequences is closer 
to what actually could have happened, the fact remains that with 
no more precise evidence than what the prosecution presented at 
trial, this evidence was clearly insufficient to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Showaker had the opportunity to 
enter and burn Diamond Industrial on the night of September 3, 
1984, and Defendant therefore respectfully requests that this 
Court overturn his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant 
seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case 
to the district court with an order for either dismissal 
of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 4 day of November, 19 
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-^Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-6-102. Arson.—(1) A person is guilty of arson if, under circum-
stances not amounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire or explosives, 
he unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
(a) Any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) The property of another. 
(2) A violation of subsection (a) is a felony of the third degree. A 
violation of subsection (b) is a felony of the third degree if the damage 
caused exceeds $5,000 value; a class A misdemeanor if the damage exceeds 
$1,000 but is not more than $5,000 value; a class B misdemeanor if the dam-
age caused exceeds $250 but is not more than $L,000; any other violation 
is a class C misdemeanor. 
76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. 
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